【财政学文献研讨会】第十二期


2017-04-05 10:32:16 来源:中国人民大学    点击:590

论文题目: Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States(Daron Acemoglu,Journal of Monetary Economics,52 (2005) ,1199–1226.)
时    间:2017年4月11日 星期二  12:00 – 13:30
地    点:明德主楼610
主    讲:胡深  中国人民大学2016级财政学博士

摘要: While much research in political economy points out the benefits of “limited government,” political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less-developed nations by “weak states,” which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors. I construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self-interested ruler, who tries to divert resources for his own consumption, but who can also invest in socially productive public goods. Both weak and strong states create distortions. When the state is excessively strong, the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled. When the state is excessively weak, the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and under invests in public goods. I show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the economic power of the state (i.e., its ability to raise taxes) and its political power (i.e., its ability to remain entrenched from the citizens). I also discuss how under certain circumstances a different type of equilibrium, which I refer to as “consensually strong state equilibrium,” can emerge whereby the state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods. The consensually strong state might best correspond to the state in OECD countries where taxes are high despite significant control by the society over the government.

主持人:李时宇 副教授

财政学文献研讨会是由中国人民大学财政金融学院财政系主办,由财政系在读研究生剖析财政学经典或前沿文献,并对财政领域热点问题形成理论思考和系统看法。研讨会主题主要包括:政府行为、财政体制、税收体制及宏观经济等。
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