Laboratories of Democracy: Policy Experimentation under Decentralization
摘要：We develop a model of policy experimentation in which the policy decisions of local and national politicians are driven by career concerns. When politicians’ payoffs are convex in their reputation and policymaking is opaque, local politicians experiment by introducing more diverse policies than national politicians do. The welfare implications of decentralization depend on homogeneity between districts. In particular, voter learning about policies is greater under decentralization if and only if the districts are sufficiently homogeneous. The model delivers novel testable hypotheses. Decentralization should be positively correlated with more diverse (uniform) local policies among countries with opaque (transparent) policymaking.
报告人简介：美国约翰-霍普金斯大学(Johns Hopkins University)商学院助理教授，美国西北大学(Northwestern University)凯洛格商学院博士，研究成果发表于American Economic Journal: Microeconomics等顶级研究期刊。