Yongzheng Liu, Liyan Wang, Maoliang Ye

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Scholars have long debated whether better institutions and governance, such as political freedom, anti-corruption measures, and the rule of law, can empower citizens and enhance their happiness. However, the current literature on the relationship between democracy and happiness has some limitations, including the lack of consensus on the outcomes; the focus on the general relationship between democracy and happiness while neglecting the impact of different forms of democracy; and insufficient research on democratic participation in the rural areas of populous countries like China. This study aims to bridge these gaps by examining the impact of competitive elections, particularly direct nomination of village leaders by villagers, on the happiness of rural residents in China.

Although the literature on the relationship between democracy and happiness has been growing, no consensus has been reached. There is still disagreement on whether democracy has an impact on happiness, as well as the mechanisms and conditions under which democracy affects happiness. This paper specifically focuses on the potential mechanisms through which democracy influences happiness, namely, the impact of democracy on accountability, which can be summarized in two aspects: first, democratic systems influence governance performance by improving the quality of political leaders; second, electoral competition helps reduce political rents, thereby enhancing governance performance.

China’s unique grassroots electoral practices provide an opportunity to study this issue. The 1982 Constitution formally recognized the status of village committees as grassroots mass self-government organizations. Since then, the forms of rural elections have evolved and improved, leading to three candidate nomination methods: villager nomination, party committee nomination, and township party committee nomination. The differences in candidate nomination methods represent different forms of democratic practice, which determine who the elected leaders are accountable to and what incentives they face. Based on existing literature, this paper argues that among the three nomination methods, direct villager nomination is the most competitive and involves the highest level of public participation in decision-making. Additionally, this highly competitive electoral form shapes the incentives for candidates' elections and re-election, making them more likely to be accountable to local residents, which in turn may influence villagers' participation in elections and their subjective well-being. Therefore, the core hypothesis of this paper is to examine the effects of village elections or direct nomination on the subjective well-being of rural residents and local accountability in China.