【金融高端论坛】第九十四期

【本期主题】Job Security and Earnings Management

CEO dismissal risk may have disciplinary or opportunistic effect on earnings management. The disciplinary effect incentivizes CEOs to undertake actions to improverealperformance, which reduces the need for earnings management, especially for the need of overstating firm performance, while CEOs with opportunistic motives may choose to exaggerate earnings information. With a large sample, we show that, on average, the disciplinary effect dominates. That is, an increase of CEO dismissal hazard is associated with smaller earnings-inflating accruals and less real earnings management. The opportunistic effect is still possible but exists only when dismissal risk is very high. Our evidence suggests that the threat of forced turnover is an effective governance measure that motivates CEOs to undertake rightful actions.

【报告人】李荻 助理教授，北京大学汇丰商学院

【时 间】6月22日 上午10:00

【地 点】明德主楼509室

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报告人简介：

李荻博士，北京大学汇丰商学院助理教授。2012年获美国密歇根大学Ross商学院金融学博士学位。曾经任教于佐治亚州立大学Robinson商学院。从事的研究领域及方向为公司金融，公司治理，和公司并购。曾在Journal of Financial Economics，Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Management Science等顶级金融经济期刊上发表过论文。

中国人民大学金融高端论坛组委会

商学院财务与金融系

财政金融学院保险系

财政金融学院应用金融系

财政金融学院货币金融系

汉青经济与金融高级研究院金融系