2012

Xu, R., X. Zhao, Z. Zheng——Actual Problems of Economics: Why Did Investment Banks Take More Risk Than Optimal? A Theoretical Analysis of Reasons for Subpri...

时间:2012-01-25
In this paper we build a game model to show that highpower compensation incentive, following strategies under information asymmetry and severe competition, and government's bailout policies and deregulation are the main reasons to tempt investment banks to take too much risk.Our work supports the empirical findings of R. Fahlenbrach & R.M. Stulz (2011) while refutes the conclusion of Alan Blinder(2009) that poor incentives were "one of the most fundamental causes"for the crisis.
上一篇:郑志刚 ——《金融评论》:经理人超额薪酬和公司治理 下一篇:吕冰洋 , 谢耀智 ——《经济理论与经济管理》:间接税对供需失衡的影响分析
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