报告题目：Are There Any Gains from Social Security Privatization

时 间：2010年12月15日 星期三 12:00 – 14:00

地 点：明德主楼610

报 告 人：李时宇

Abstract：Increasing calls for a social security reform of switching from the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system to a funded system has been seen in recent decades. This paper examines the effect of this reform on capital accumulation and the welfare of each generation. Three methods are used to finance the pension debt, government debt financing, tax financing, and government asset financing. With government debt or tax financing, the market equilibrium remains unchanged and all generations are as well off in the new system as in the PAYGO system. Thus, switching from a PAYGO system to a funded system is neutral. With government asset financing, the interest rate will decrease, private capital will increase, but the total output may either increase or decrease. The welfare effect is also ambiguous in general, depending on the rate of return of government assets. With plausible parameters, our simulation shows that the reform will lower the interest rate, increase private capital, and lower government capital in the short run, but raise government capital and increase output in the long run.

Keywords：Social Security Reforms, PAYGO System, Funded System, Overlapping Generations Model

报告人简介：李时宇，北京大学经济学院财政系博士研究生，2011年7月毕业。 主要研究方向为公共财政、社会保障和经济增长，2009/2010年期间在波士顿大学交流访问14个月。目前，在《财经研究》上发表1篇中文论文，另有3篇英文论文分别投稿至《Review of Income and Wealth》, 《China Economic Review》和《Social Science Journal》。